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UNIONS, CONGLOMERATES, AND SECONDARY
ACTIVITY UNDER THE NLRA
A union involved in a labor dispute with an employer will
often try to pressure the employer into meeting its demands by
sponsoring strikes, boycotts,' picketing, or other activities designed
to improve the union's bargaining position. Such activities are
generally lawful if directed against and confined to the primary
employer, the employer with whom the union has the dispute.
These same activities, however, are generally proscribed by section
8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 if they are
directed against a secondary, or neutral, employer, producer, or
person.3 More specifically, it is an unfair labor practice under
this section for the union to engage in, induce, or encourage a
strike or concerted refusal to handle the goods of or perform ser-
vices for a neutral employer, or to threaten, coerce or restrain any
person engaged in commerce, when the union's objective is to force
any person to cease handling the products of "any other producer"
or to force "any person" to cease doing business with "any other
person." 4 A proviso to section 8(b)(4) exempts nonpicketing pub-
I A boycott is a refusal to deal with an employer. A strike is simply one kind
of a boycott, in that it is a refusal to deal manifested by a refusal to work for the
employer. Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLtJm. L. REv.
1363, 1364 n.5 (1962). Therefore, all analytical references to boycotts in this
Comment will be referring to both boycotts and strikes.
2 National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] § 8(b) (4), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). See note 4 infra.
3 "Person" is defined by the NLRA as including "one or more individuals, labor
organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees,
trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." NLRA § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).
"Producer" is not defined by the NLRA.
4NLRA §8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) (1976). The section
reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is forc-
ing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing
or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of section 9: Provided, That nothing contained in this
clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise un-
lawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
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licity.5 This proviso is limited, however, by the requirement that
the publicity be for the purpose of informing the public that "a
product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by
another employer." 6
A key question under the publicity proviso is whether a par-
ticular employer is the producer of a product or products distributed
by another, ostensibly neutral, employer. A recent National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) decision, United Steelworkers (Pet,
Inc.),7 continues the trend of defining broadly the term "pro-
ducer." 8 It is the first decision to hold that the publicity proviso
permits a union representing a struck plant of a conglomerate sub-
sidiary to distribute handbills requesting a consumer boycott of
the entire conglomerate. The Board's rationale for this holding is
that the struck plant was a "producer" of the products of the
entire conglomerate. 9 This decision represents a major expansion
of the term "producer." It departs significantly from previous
Board and court decisions interpreting the publicity proviso to
require some connection along the line of production between
the producer of a struck product and the employer at which the
nonpicketing publicity is directed.10
The Pet logic could be extended beyond the publicity proviso
to the similar "producer" and "person" language in section
5NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
6 The full text of the publicity proviso reads:
Provided . . . nothing contained in such paragraph [8(b)(4)] shall be
construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by
another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of in-
ducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver,
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment
of the employer engaged in such distribution.
Id.
7244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (Aug. 10, 1979), [1979-80] NLRB Dec. ff 16,127, at
30, 188, appeal docketed, No. 79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 1979).
8 See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964); Great W. Broadcasting
Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1966); Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Lohman Sales Co.) 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961); Affeldt, Group Sanctions and
Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(b)(4): An Integrated Approach to Labor Law, 54 GEo. L.J.
55, 104 (1965); Note, Publicity Proviso of Section 8(b)(4) Given Broad Construc-
tion by NLRB, 62 COLum. L. Rv. 543, 546-48 (1962); Note, Picketing and Pub-
licity Under Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA, 73 Y.LE LJ. 1265, 1271-73 (1964);
44 OR. L. REv. 301, 312 (1965).
9 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 19, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,193. See text accom-
panying notes 45-65 infra.
3
0 See notes 68-79 infra & accompanying text.
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8(b)(4)(B)." Under the Pet rationale, the entire Pet conglom-
erate could be considered one producer. There would then be no
"other" producer or person within the conglomerate's structure for
purposes of the section; and the union could picket or shut down
any Pet plant without violating the secondary boycott provisions of
the NLRA.1
2
This Comment discusses the implications of the Board's ex-
panded definition of "producer," focusing on the scope of per-
missible union activity directed against conglomerates under the Pet
publicity proviso holding and under the body of case law inter-
preting section 8(b)(4)(B), and on the need for a new standard to
determine the legality of such activity.' 3 Part I reviews the rele-
vant case law prior to Pet interpreting the publicity proviso and
section 8(b)(4)(B). Part II discusses the Pet decision and the prob-
lems created by the Board's holding. Part III analyzes the difficul-
ties a union faces when it attempts to use its economic weapons
against a subsidiary of a conglomerate, particularly when the weapon
sought to be used is a secondary boycott. Finally, Part IV pro-
poses that the Board adopt a present and apparent means-of-control
test for cases involving section 8(b)(4)(B), permitting a union to
use economic pressure against an entire conglomerate where the
union shows complete or close to complete ownership by the parent
corporation of a struck subsidiary and the parent fails to demon-
strate that it does not have the present and apparent means to con-
trol the struck subsidiary.
I. PERMISSIBLE Acrrvrrs UNDER SECTION 8(b)(4)
A. The Publicity Proviso
The publicity proviso permits, by means "other than picket-
ing," appeals to consumers to cease patronizing a company which
"distributes" products produced by the struck employer. When a
union seeks to justify secondary activity on the basis of the pro-
viso, a determination must therefore be made whether the secondary
employer is a distributor of the struck product. If the secondary
employer falls within this category, the union will not have vio-
"1 There must be an "other producer" or "other person" against whom union
activities are directed for the union to violate this statute. See note 4 supra.
12The Board left this broader, non-proviso issue open. 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6
at 15 n.23, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,188. See text accompanying notes 50 &
51 infra.
' 3 Potential grounds of decision which were not discussed in Pet and which will
not be discussed in this Comment include whether the union's activity was coercive
under section 8(b)(4)(B), whether its handbilling activity had a lawful objective,
and whether or not restraints on handbilling activity violate the first amendment.
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lated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by asking consumers to boycott the sec-
ondary employer's entire business.
In Local 537, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Loh-
man Sales Co.),14 a wholesale distributor of cigarettes and cigars
was involved in a primary dispute. The union distributed hand-
bills at retail stores requesting customers not to buy cigarettes from
Lohman. The Board held that the handbilling was protected by
the publicity proviso even though the primary employer was a dis-
tributor rather than a manufacturer. Lohman did not need to
manufacture a tangible product in order to be considered a pro-
ducer within the meaning of the publicity proviso. It was sufficient
that Lohman added value to the final product by contributing labor
in the form of "capital, enterprise, and service to the product
[furnished to] retailers." 15
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Servette, Inc.,16 agreed with
the Board's Lohman holding and concluded that the publicity pro-
viso encompasses distributors as well as manufacturers. Servette
involved a strike against a wholesale distributor of food products.
The union threatened to, and in some cases did, distribute in front
of supermarkets handbills asking the public to refrain from pur-
chasing goods supplied by the distributor. Finding that the pub-
licity proviso to section 8(b)(4) was the "outgrowth of a profound
Senate concern that the unions' freedom to appeal to the public
for support of their case be adequately safeguarded," and that noth-
ing in the legislative history suggested that "the protection of the
proviso was intended to be any narrower in coverage than the pro-
hibition to which it is an exception," 1" the Court held that the
union's activity was protected by the publicity proviso. To justify
14 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
15 Id. 907. See also United Plant Guard Workers (Houston Armored Car Co.),
136 N.L.R.B. 110 (1962); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 712 (Golden
Dawn Foods), 134 N.L.R.B. 812 (1961); Local 968, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Schepps Grocery Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1961); Plumbers and Pipefitters Local
142 (Piggly Wiggly), 133 N.L.R.B. 307 (1961).
The scope of a secondary boycott permitted by § 8(b) (4) (B) was further ex-
panded by the Board in Local 662, Radio and Television Engineers (Middle South
Broadcasting). 133 N.L.R.B. 1698 (1961). The union had distributed leaflets
asking consumers for a total boycott of merchants advertising on a struck radio
station, and the station argued that any secondary boycott must be limited to the
products actually advertised on the struck station. The Board held that § 8(b)
(4)(B) was not violated because the publicity proviso permits a total consumer
boycott of a secondary employer's entire business. The union's publicity therefore
could be directed at any product of a secondary employer (an advertising mer-
chant) even if the product was not produced by (advertised on) the struck station.
Id. 1705. See also International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 139 (Oak Constr.,
Inc.), 226 N.L.R.B. 759 (1976).
16377 U.S. 46 (1964).
17 Id. 55.
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this holding, the Court did not attempt to explain, as was done in
Lohman, why a distributor of goods should be included as a "pro-
ducer" within the meaning of the proviso."' Instead, the Court
reasoned that the term "produced" has always been held to apply
to the wholesale distribution of goods." 19
The definition of producer was expanded further in Great
Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB 20 to include providers of
services who do not handle a tangible good. The union in Great
Western was involved in a primary dispute with a radio station
and sought to use nonpicketing publicity activities to persuade busi-
nesses to cease advertising on the struck station. The Board held
that the union's activities were protected.by the publicity proviso.
The radio station added its advertising services to the products ad-
vertised on the station and was therefore a producer of the advertised
products within the meaning of the publicity proviso. 2' Enforc-
ing the Board's decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the broad
interpretations previously given the proviso, stating that "whatever
difficulties an analytical dissecting of the proviso may reveal, they
are not to stand in the way of giving that proviso a scope com-
mensurate with the section to which it is appended." 22
B. Determinations of Employer Neutrality
Under Section 8(b)(4)
Section 8(b)(4)(B) distinguishes a union's primary activities,
those directed against a primary employer, from its secondary ac-
tivities, those directed against a neutral employer. Generally, sec-
ondary activities not exempted by the publicity proviso are pro-
hibited by the section.23 However, in some instances, boycotting
and picketing are allowed against a secondary employer so long
as the activity's major impact is on the primary labor dispute.
Is See text accompanying note 15 supra.
19 Servette, 377 U.S. at 56 (footnote omitted).
20356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1966).
21 AFTRA (Great Western Broadcasting Corp.), 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 472 (1964),
enforced, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002 (1966).
22 Great Western, 356 F.2d at 436-37.
28 See notes 1-3 supra & accompanying text. The 1959 Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments to § 8(b) (4) added "express exceptions for the primary strike and primary
picketing." United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 496 (1964).
Another proviso to § 8(b) (4), it should be noted, excepts from unlawfulness
the refusal of any person to cross a picket line set up at any lawfully struck em-
ployer's premises. While this conduct resembles secondary activity in that a
neutral employer whose employees refuse to cross the picket line of a struck em-
ployer suffers from a dispute not his own and over which he has no control, it is
not the type of organized secondary activity to which this Comment is addressed.
See generally R. Gonm", BAsic TEXT orN LAB oR LAw 322-23 (1976).
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Thus, where a union "follows the struck product" to a neutral
distributor, it has the right to picket to persuade consumers to boy-
cott that particular product.24 Activity is also permitted against
the secondary employer when it shares a common situs with
the primary employer.25 A third doctrine, the "ally doctrine," is
of major significance to this Comment because it will often be an
issue when a union involved in a dispute with one unit of a conglo-
merate wishes to further its position by picketing or boycotting
the conglomerate itself or another of its subsidiaries. In such a
case, the union will argue that under the ally doctrine such
picketing or boycotting does not constitute secondary activity be-
cause the purported neutral is so "closely related to the primary
employer and the dispute with the union [that] he loses his neu-
trality and may be treated as a primary party to the dispute." 26
The ally doctrine, then, is a tool which the Board 27 and the courts
2 4 The leading case on consumer picketing is NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964). The union, in support of
its strike against fruit packers and warehousemen, picketed consumer entrances to
supermarkets to persuade the public not to purchase Washington State apples be-
cause they were packed by nonunion packers. Relying principally upon legislative
history, the Supreme Court held that §8(b)(4)(B) does not prohibit peaceful
secondary picketing confined to persuading customers to cease buying the struck
product of the primary employer. The Court stated that a total secondary boy-
cott, rather than a boycott limited to the struck product, was the "'isolated evil"'
flowing from picketing at which this legislation was directed. Id. 63. See gen-
erally Comment, Product Picketing-A New Loophole in Section 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 682 (1965); Comment, Secondary
Consumer Picketing: Some Grafts on Tree Fruits, 44 TuL. L. REv. 537 (1970).
The Supreme Court recently limited Tree Fruits by holding that a situation of
consumer picketing directed at the primary product was illegal where sales of the
struck product comprised over ninety percent of the secondary employers' gross in-
comes. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 48
U.S.L.W. 4796 (1980).
Consumer picketing is also limited by the merged product doctrine. If the
primary employer's goods or services are "merged" into the goods or services of
the secondary employer, so that appealing for a consumer boycott of the struck
product is equivalent to appealing for a total secondary boycott, consumer picketing
to induce such a boycott violates § 8(b) (4) (B). American Bread Co. v. NLRB,
411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969). See also K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d
1228, 1234 (3rd Cir. 1979); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB
(Hawaii Press Newspapers, Inc.), 401 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cement
Masons Local 337 (Cal. Ass'n of Employers), 190 N.L.R.B. 261, 264-65 (1971);
Comment, Limitation on Product Picketing-Honolulu Typographical Union No.
37, 9 B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REv. 792 (1968); Comment, Consumer Picketing
and the Single-Product Secondary Employer, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 112, 133 (1979);
Note, Picketing and Publicity Under Section 8(b)(4) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 73 YALE L.J. 1265, 1280-82 (1964).
25 See Sailors' Union of the Pac. (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547
(1950); Local 662, Radio and Television Eng'rs (Middle South Broadcasting),
133 N.L.R.B. 1698 (1961) (relying on Moore Dry Dock).
2
6
R. DEREsES KY, THm NLRB AND SEcoNmDAY BoYcorTS 50 (1972). See
generally R. GOBMAN, supra note 23, at 247.
27 t should be noted that, although for reasons of convenience this Comment
will refer to the ally doctrine as being applied by the Board and the courts, which
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have developed to help determine whether a union has been acting
lawfully against a nonneutral employer when the union is accused of
acting unlawfully against a neutral employer.28
The ally doctrine has two branches: it applies when an em-
ployer performs struck work for the primary employer,29 and it
may also apply when an employer is related to the primary em-
ployer through common ownership. 30 In either case, it provides
a rational framework for determining on a case-by-case basis whether
an employer is "wholly unconcerned" with the labor dispute 31 or
whether it is sufficiently involved in the primary employer's busi-
ness to lose its neutral status.32 This analysis is undertaken to
further the dual labor policies of preserving a labor organization's
right to exert pressure on offending employers, while shielding
other employers from disputes not their own.33
A party performing struck work is considered firmly allied
with the targeted employer and therefore becomes a party to the
dispute. Struck work is work "which but for the strike would be
performed by the employees of the primary employer." 34 The third
party thus alleviates the union's pressure on the targeted employer,
review findings of neutrality, any statement made concerning the general applica-
tion of the doctrine refers also to its application by the Board's General Counsel
and by the administrative law judges who hear the unfair labor practice complaints.
It is the General Counsel's regional attorneys who must first decide whether a
union's conduct is unfair under § 8(b) (4); if they so decide, they must present
their complaint to the administrative law judge. In both cases, then, the relevant
legal standards are found in the decisions of the Board itself and reviewing courts
of appeals, but those standards are first utilized by the regional attorneys and ad-
ministrative law judges. See generally R. Gorm", supra note 23, at 7-9.
28Differentiating primary from secondary activity often requires drawing fine
distinctions based on careful analysis of the relationship between the primary
employer and the purported neutral employer. "Important as is the distinction be-
tween legitimate 'primary activity' and banned 'secondary activity,' it does not pre-
sent a glaringly bright line." Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673 (1961).
29 See notes 34 & 35 infra & accompanying text.
30 See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
31 See, e.g., Carpet Layers Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392, 401 (D.C. Cir.
1972); NLRB v. Local 810, Steel, Metals, Alloys & Hardware Fabricators, 460
F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972); Vulcan Materials Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
963 (1971).
3293 CONG. Rc. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
33 105 CONG. Rc. A6653 (1959) (remarks of Mr. Levitan), reprinted in 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIV'E HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTnG AND Drs-
CLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1776 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 2 LEG. HIST.].
See NLRB v. Local 325, Int'l Union of Operating Engr's, 400 U.S. 297, 302-03
(1971); Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93,
100 (1958); NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675, 692 (1951); Vulcan Materials Co., 430 F.2d at 451; Miami Newspaper Press-
men's Local 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
34R. DEnEsWsasr, supra note 26, at 59 (emphasis in original).
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while deriving an economic benefit from the added business. The
direct impact on the labor dispute caused by the "farming out"
of struck work presents a situation analogous to the hiring of
strikebreakers, justifying the removal of secondary boycott protec-
tion from the third party.3 5
The seminal struck-work case is Douds v. Metropolitan Federa-
tion of Architects Local 231.86 Upon the advent of a strike, the
struck company in that case markedly increased its subcontracts
with the purported neutral. The district court refused to issue
an injunction against the union's picketing of the subcontractor
because it found that the two employers were completely united
in interest.37 It has similarly been held that where an employer
being struck directs its service-contract customers to independent
companies, and then remunerates those companies directly for its
customers' work, the independent employers become allies, sus-
ceptible to the whole range of union pressure.38 In both situations,
the third party's business expands with work that would otherwise
be handled by the strikers.
Another situation in which two employers will be treated as a
single employer occurs when the firms are allied through common
ownership and control.3 9 To determine whether two companies
are allied, the Board and the courts look for, inter alia, common
ownership, common management, common control of labor rela-
tions, integration of business operations, and the degree of de-
pendence of one company on the other.40 Because potential con-
trol is not sufficient, the existence of common ownership alone
will not support an alliance finding. A union may not widen the
dispute beyond the initially struck employer unless one of the
employers exercises actual control over the other.
41
35 Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672, 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); B. DEnEsinNsar, supra note 26, at 58; R. GoBMAN, supra note
23, at 244.
3675 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
87 Id. 677.
38 NLRB v. Business Machs. and Office Appliance Mechanics Bd. Local 459
(Royal Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962
(1956).
39 See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 223 v. Atlas Sheet Metal Co., 384
F.2d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1967). Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local 40, 322 F.2d
at 408-09; J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771, 773-74 (1st Cir. 1958).
40 Local 810, Steel, Metals, Alloys & Hardware Fabricators, 460 F.2d at 5;
NLRB v. General Teamster Local 126, 435 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 1970); Vulcan
Materials Co., 430 F.2d at 451; Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local 46, 322 F.2d
at 408-09; Employing Lithographers v. NLRB, 301 F.2d 20, 29 (5th Cir. 1962).
41 General Teamster Local 126, 435 F.2d at 291; San Francisco-Oakland News-
paper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1969); Sheet Metal Workers,
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A conglomerate failing to meet the conditions of the actual
control test consists of separate and distinct "persons." 42 Union
pressure against the noninvolved units of such a conglomerate is
proscribed under section 8(b)(4)(B) as a secondary boycott. For
example, in Los Angles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Pub-
lications),48 the union struck the Los Angles Herald Examiner and
picketed the San Francisco Examiner, another Hearst division.
The Board held that the San Francisco activity violated the NLRA
because "separate corporate subsidiaries are separate persons, each
entitled to the protection of section 8(b)(4)(B) from the labor dis-
putes of the other." 4
II. Pet: THE DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Pet, Incorporated is a billion-dollar, diversified conglomerate
with sales and operations throughout the United States and in
several foreign countries.4 5 In late 1977, the United Steelworkers
union, representing striking employees at one plant of a Pet sub-
sidiary, Hussmann Refrigerator Company, attempted to organize a
consumer boycott of all Pet products and retail stores.46  The boy-
cott did not differentiate between Pet subsidiaries that purchased
384 F.2d at 105; Bachman Machine v. NLBB, 266 F.2d 599, 605 (8th Cir. 1959);
J. G. Roy & Sons Co., 251 F.2d at 773; Drivers Local 639 (Poole's Warehousing,
Inc.), 158 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1286 (1966); Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen Local
46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1962), enforced sub nom.,
Miami Newspaper Pressmens Local 46 v. NLBB, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
42 Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Publications), 185 N.L.R.B.
303, 304 (1970), enforced per curiam, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1018 (1972); see R. Goap__,N, supra note 23, at 250.
43 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced per curiam, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
44 Id. 304. See generally Siegal, Conglomerates, Subsidiaries, Divisions, and
the Secondary Boycott, 9 GA. L. Rxv. 329 (1975). Although some subsequent
decisions have impliedly questioned the validity of Hearst, the Board's holding has
never been overruled, and remains the controlling decision on this issue. See, e.g.,
Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1976).
45 United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6, (Aug. 10, 1979),
[1979-80] NLRB Dec. ff 16,127, at 30, 188, appeal docketed, No. 79-1852 (8th Cir.
Oct. 10, 1979). Among Pet's major divisions and subsidiaries are Whitman's Choco-
lates, Pet Frozen Foods, Stuckey's Inc., 9-0-5 Liquor Stores, and Pet Dairy Prod-
ucts. For a definition of "conglomerate," see note 94 infra & accompanying text.
46 Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 6, 10-11, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,190. The
collective bargaining agreement covering the striking employees expired on May 1,
1977. The employees were on strike when the boycott was announced by the union
president at a televised press conference on October 21, 1977. The announcement
was followed by newspaper advertisements and handbills explaining that there was
a strike against the Hussmann plant, noting that Hussmann was part of Pet, and
urging consumers to boycott listed Pet products and stores. The handbilling was
orderly, peaceful, unaccompanied by picketing, and took place away from estab-
lishments that were owned by Pet or that sold Pet products. The parties stipulated
that this conduct did not induce any individual employee to refuse to make de-
liveries or perform services. Id. at 10-12, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,190-91.
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products from Hussmann and those that did not.47 Pet countered
by filing a complaint with the Board, charging the Steelworkers
with committing an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the NLRA.48  Pet argued that the union's publicity activities
on behalf of the boycott violated that section because they consti-
tuted coercion and/or restraint directed at the parent and specified
subsidiaries that were "neutral" persons and therefore should have
been exempt from union pressure. The Board General Counsel
argued on Pet's behalf that the publicity had an illegal object of
causing a cessation of business among Pet divisions and subsidiaries
and between Pet and its customers, suppliers and distributors. 49
The Board specifically declined to decide whether the Steel-
worker's publicity efforts violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)8 0 Instead,
it held that the struck subsidiary is a " 'producer' of the products
of Pet and its other subsidiaries and divisions as that term is used
in the publicity proviso." 51 The proviso was thus held to exempt
the union's publicity activities against the entire conglomerate from
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
The Board based its holding upon its interpretation of prior
cases dealing with the definition of producer52-Lohman, 13 Ser-
vette,54 Great Western,55 and Middle South Broadcasting 66-and its
assessment of Hussmann's contribution to the Pet conglomerate. It
assessed this contribution by examining Pet's structure and finan-
cial policies involving the Hussmann subsidiary. Pet is organized
into four groups: Convenience and Specialty Foods, Milk and Dairy
Products, Store Environments and Distribution Services, and Spe-
cialty Retailing and Consumer Services.57 These groups are sub-
divided into twenty-seven separate operating divisions, each en-
gaging in separate and distinct lines of business.5 8 Pet appoints and
47 Solien v. United Steelworkers, 449 F. Supp. 580, 581 (E.D. Mo. 1978),
rev'd, 593 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 54 (1979) (appeal of sec-
tion 10(1) order enjoining the Steelworkers from organizing a secondary boycott of
Pet products).
48 Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 12, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,191. See note
2 supra, for the statutory text.
491d. at 12-13, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,191.
5o Id. at 15 n.2 3, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,194 n.23.
51 Id. at 19, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,193.
52 See notes 14-22 supra & accompanying text.
53 1nternational Bhd. of Teamsters Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B.
901 (1961).
54 NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
55 Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1966).
56Local 662, Radio and Television Eng'rs (Middle South Broadcasting), 133
N.L.R.B. 1698 (1961).
5 7 PET, INc. ANN. REP. 4 (1977).
58 Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 5, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,189.
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*determines compensation of a "Group president" who appoints the
presidents for each division in that "Group." Pet determines long-
Tange planning and major capital expenditures, formulates policies
in areas such as tax, accounting, employment, quality control, prod-
uct labeling, and spheres of permissible division business, and
maintains national business accounts that enable divisions to obtain
products and services at discounted prices. Pet's consolidated finan-
cial statements reflect the earnings of its subsidiaries. 0
Hussmann, the largest business in the Store Environments
.group, is a separately incorporated and wholly owned subsidiary of
Pet.60 Hussmann manufactures primarily commercial and indus-
trial refrigeration and storage equipment in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, and markets this equipment internationally. 61
It operates as an essentially independent business entity, determin-
ing its own policies regarding product line, advertising, pricing, and
market strategy. It has a separate financial system and bank account
and has complete control over its day-to-day operations, division
labor relations, and employment policies.6 2 It has received from
Pet, however, an interest-free, unsecured loan in excess of fifty mil-
lion dollars and has utilized Pet legal department counsel.63
The Board concluded that prior cases allow a union to "law-
7fully urge, via handbilling or other nonpicketing publicity, a total
consumer boycott of a neutral employer, so long as the primary
-employer has at some stage produced, in the sense of applying capi-
tal, enterprise, or service, a product of the neutral employer." "
It then held that Hussmann met this test by contributing diver-
sification, actual or potential profits, and "a measure of goodwill"
to the rest of the conglomerate."
The Pet opinion is important for at least five reasons. First,
prior to this case, the Board and the courts had never decided
whether a union may, by publicity alone, request a total consumer
boycott of all the products and retail outlets of a parent company
and its subsidiaries when only one subsidiary is involved in a labor
-dispute with the union.66 In light of the large and growing number
59 Id. at 2-3, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,189.
60 Id. at 2, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,189.
61 PET, INC. ANN. REP. 4 (1977). This equipment is used in operations such
.as grocery and general merchandise stores.
62 Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 6-7, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,189.
63 Id. at 8-9, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,190.
64Id. at 18, [1979-80] NLBB Dec. at 30,193 (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 19-20, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,193.
66 Petitioners Brief for Review of an Order of the NLRB at vi, Pet, Inc. v.
NLBB, No. 79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 1979).
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of conglomerates,67 situations similar to that in Pet will no doubt
reoccur.
Second, by holding that Hussmann is a "producer of all the
products of Pet and its subsidiaries and divisions," 68 and that Pet
therefore could be boycotted, the Board apparently discarded the
producer-distributor nexus previously held to be required by the
publicity proviso.69 The nexus requirement is inserted in the pro-
viso by the language "produced by . . . [a primary] employer . . .
and ... distributed by another employer." 70 The earlier expansion
of the term "producer" to include "all forms of labor or service" 71
adhered to the traditional boycott notion, originally provided for in
the Taft-Hartley Act, permitting a union to follow struck products
or services to their destination. 72  The issue in Servette,78 Great
Western, 74 and Lohman 75 concerned the extent to which a given
primary employer could be considered a producer of the services
distributed by the complaining secondary employer. Construing
"producer" to include the services of advertisers, distributors, and
others in these service-provider cases constituted continued adher-
ence to the line-of-production test.76 The Board's decision in Pet,
however, does not utilize this traditional concept of a producer.
Hussmann clearly produced tangible commercial and industrial
products that the union could have boycotted under established
precedents; the legal issue arising in Pet was whether Hussmann also
"produces" Pet products that it does not manufacture, handle, dis-
6 7 See note 99 infra.
68Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 20, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,193.
69 The decision is unclear on this question. It does not explicitly state whether
the Board found any producer-distributor nexus between Hussmann and Pet. The
Board's Brief to the Eighth Circuit, however, by arguing that the type of business
relationship between two parties should not determine the union's right to appeal
to the public so long as the boycott attempts to result in a rejection of the primary's
contribution to those products, suggests that the nexus requirement has been
abandoned. NLRB's Brief for Review of an Order of the NLBB at 24-25, Pet,
Inc. v. NLBB, No. 79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 1979).
7029 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). See note 6 supra.
71 McLeod v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics Conf. Bd., 300
F.2d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1962).
72 International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 139 (Oak Const. Inc.), 226
N.L.R.B. 759, 759 (1976) (distinguishing between struck and nonstruck products);
2 LEG. HIsT., supra note 33, at 1389 (remarks of Senator Kennedy) (noting that the
right to follow struck work was provided under Taft-Hartley Act).
73NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1946). See text accompanying
notes 16-19 supra.
74 Great Western Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1966).
See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra,
75 International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B.
901 (1961). See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
76 See note 78 infra & accompanying text.
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tribute, or otherwise contribute to along the line of production.
The Board decided that Hussmann produces anything to which it
"'at some stage"-not necessarily along the line of production-applies
"'capital, enterprise or service." 7 This new test, requiring only
economic enhancement rather than a producer-distributor nexus,
represents a major shift from Lohman, which required that the labor
of the primary employer, in the form of capital, enterprise, and
service, be applied to a boycotted product in the initial or inter-
mediate stages of product marketing.78 The significance of this
extension is that it broadens the scope of permissible union activity
to cover a much earlier stage in the production process. Under the
Board's new test, Hussmann need only contribute profit or potential
profit 79 to Pet's current or future products to be considered a pro-
ducer of these products. In effect, the line-of-production test-and
with it the literal language of the statute-have been abandoned.
A third significant aspect of the Pet test is that it abandons a
previous requirement that a "producer" actually contribute service
to the products it produces. Although the Board found in this
case that Hussmann contributed "capital, enterprise, and service
to Pet and its other subsidiaries and divisions," 80 it required only
a showing that Hussmann had contributed "capital, enterprise, or
service" to Pet.81 This change in wording from past decisions was
not inadvertent. 2 It expands the targets of permissible union ac-
77 244 NLBB No. 6 at 18, [1979-801 NLBB Dec. at 30,193. Note that if the
labor dispute had been with the parent corporation, the same test would have
resulted in a finding that the parent corporation, because of the loans it made and
the services it provided to its subsidiaries, is a producer of its subsidiaries' products.
This result follows because the economic enhancement test bears no relation to
the marketing of a product along the line of production.
78 International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B.
901, 907 (1961).
Although a few decisions contain broader language than Lohman, they relied
on or voiced agreement with Lohman and had fact patterns amenable to a Lohman
test. See, e.g., Servette, 377 U.S. at 55 (1964) (services of wholesale distributor
of food products were distributed by supermarkets); Great Western, 356 F.2d at
436-37 (9th Cir. 1966) (advertising considered to be a product distributed by
neutral advertisers). See text accompanying notes 16-22 supra. There is no
indication from these opinions that the courts contemplated extending the publicity
proviso to situations where the primary and secondary employer have no line-of-
production relationship in which the primary's labor is applied to the product
distributed by the secondary employer.
7 9 Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 19, [1979-80] NLBB Dec. at 30,193.
80Id. at 19, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,193 (emphasis added).
81Id. at 18, 11979-80 NLRB Dec. at 30,193 (emphasis added).
82 See NLRB's Brief for Review of an Order of the NLRB at 22, 23 n.8, Pet,
Inc. v. NLRB, No. 79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct 10, 1979). The Board uses the "or"
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tivity further than that permitted in Lohman, in which the Board
stated that "labor is the primary requisite of one who produces," 85
and further than other precedents allowing handbilling of em-
ployers providing actual services, such as advertising or handling,
which aid in the distribution of a struck product.
Fourth, Pet significantly widens the potential range of targets
of permissible union activity by not placing any clear limitation on
who can be held a producer within the meaning of the publicity
proviso.8 4 Although future cases may limit the effect of the holding
to conglomerates, 5 the broad test enunciated in Pet does not contain
language and speaks in terms of all Pet subsidiaries contributing capital and.
enterprise, not service, to each other. This represents a retreat from the actual
Pet decision in which the Board held that the subsidiaries contributed capital,
enterprise, and service to the parent corporation and thus to each other. Although
not clear, it appears that the Board feels that a distinct service requirement is
unnecessary because the contribution of capital and enterprise is also a contribution
of service. Id. 22. See also Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
14, Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 1979). Subsequent to the
Pet decision, the Board has affirmed its new test in Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades
Council (The Edward J. De Bartolo Corp.), 252 NLRB No. 9, at 10-12 (Sept. 30,
1980).
83 132 N.L.R.B. at 907. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
84 The steelworkers were permitted to urge a consumer boycott of products of
Pet subsidiaries that had not used any Hussmann services nor had purchased any
Hussmann products. Solien v. United Steelworkers, 449 F. Supp. at 582-83.
85 There is language in the Board's appellate brief to the Eighth Circuit that
suggests that the Board may later try to limit the potential impact of its decision.
The Board states that its
conclusion that Hussman [sic] contributed to Pet's products was based,
not only on Hussmann's potential capital contributions, but also on Huss-
mann's status as an industry leader with ever-increasing sales and earnings,
a status which enhances both the reputation of Pet and its subsidiaries and
the value of Pet's stock; on Hussmann's participation in Pet's national
accounts, which enables all subsidiaries to buy at lower prices; and, most
important, on Hussmann's major role in the diversification . . . which is
central to Pet's strategy ....
NLRB's Brief for Review of an Order of the NLRB at 23 n.8, Pet, Inc. v. NLRB,
No. 79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 1979). It might be implied from this language that
the Board will require a high degree of economic enhancement of the secondary
employer's products before it will find the Pet test satisfied. This, however, does
not appear to be the case. In Pet Hussmann was operating with a negative cash.
flow in relation to its parent, which detracts somewhat from the degree it is
economically enhancing the rest of the conglomerate. 244 N.L.R.B. at 6-7,
[1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,189. In Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council
(The Edward J. De Bartolo Corp.), 252 NLRB No. 9 (Sept. 30, 1980), the Board
applied the Pet test to hold that when a union involved in a labor dispute with a
contractor working for one tenant in a shopping mall distributes handbills request-
ing that consumers boycott all the stores in the mall, the union's conduct is pro-
tected by the publicity proviso. In this fact situation, the degree of economic
enhancement that the contractor contributes to the shopping mall does not appear
to be very great.
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any such limitation. The Board's analysis, extended to its extreme
logical limits, could lead to the result that a stockholder, regardless
of the substantiality of his holdings or his ability to control a cor-
poration, could be held to be a producer of the corporation's prod-
ucts because of his capital contribution. The corporation could
also be held to be a producer of any product that its stockholders
produce because of its contribution of a portion of its profits to
such stockholders. Moreover, this analysis could be extended to
any business transaction so long as one of the two parties involved
contributes "capital, enterprise or service" to the other party.
Finally, a fifth significant result of the Pet decision is that its
economic enhancement test could conceivably be extended be-
yond the publicity proviso to the similar language of section
8(b)(4)(B). That proviso is the exception to the general statutory
command that unions may not pressure "any other producer" s6
than the one with which the union has its dispute. It allows the
union to advise consumers-without picketing-"that a product or
products [distributed by the secondary employer] are produced by
an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dis-
pute." 87 By stating that the central issue in Pet, a publicity
proviso decision, was whether Hussmann is a producer of Pet
products,8s and by formulating such a broad test to resolve that
question, Pet could have a significant impact on the definition of
"producer" in section 8(b)(4)(B). If, as the Board held, the eco-
nomic enhancement test demonstrates that Hussmann is a pro-
ducer of the products of Pet and its subsidiaries, thereby making
those businesses subject to union publicity activities, 9 that test
would also seem to demonstrate that Pet and the subsidiaries are
producers of Hussmann products. Therefore, if the union is boy-
cotting Hussmann, it could also boycott Pet's other units because
they are all producers of the struck products and do not fall within
the prohibition against striking "any other producer." In short,
there would be no "other" producers within the Pet structure be-
cause each unit is a producer of the primary employer's products.
86NLRA §8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) (1976). See note 4
supra.
87 Id. See note 6 supra.
88 "The central question for resolution, therefore, is . ..more specifically,
whether Hussmann constitutes a 'producer' within the meaning of the proviso
vs-&-vis the products of Pet .... 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 16, [1979-80] NLBB
Dec. at 30,192.
89 Id. at 20, [1979-801 NLB Dec. at 30,193. See notes 64 & 65 supra &
accompanying text. The actual holding in Pet, it should be emphasized, was
based solely on the producer language of the publicity proviso. Id. at 16, 20 &
n.33, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,192-93, 30,195 n.33.
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Under this interpretation, a union in a dispute with one Pet sub-
sidiary may boycott any Pet plant without violating the secondary
boycott provisions of the NLRA.
Section 8(b)(4)(B) also uses the term "other person." 90 The
language used by the Board in Pet suggests that the Board's in-
terpretation of "producer" could logically be extended to "per-
son." 91 When the Board held that a struck subsidiary "produces"
the products of an entire conglomerate, it implicitly refused to
accept the rationale of Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69
(Hearst Publications),92 which had established clear lines separating
corporate subsidiaries from the labor disputes of other subsidiaries
within the same corporation. 93 It would now be logically incon-
sistent for the Board to hold that a struck subsidiary "producing"
all the products of a conglomerate-and consequently making valu-
able contributions of labor, capital, or enterprise to the conglom-
erate-is separate from the other, heretofore neutral, subsidiaries.
III. A UNION'S SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH CONGLOMERATES
Before assessing the special problems a union faces when at-
tempting to bargain with one subsidiary or division of a con-
glomerate, it is first necessary to determine when an employer is
part of a conglomerate. One commentator has defined a con-
glomerate as "a firm that does business in three or more unrelated
product groups . . . and in which no single group accounts for
more than two-thirds of its total sales and earnings." 94 Pet, being
composed of four product groups, twenty-seven divisions, and busi-
nesses which cover "virtually every facet of the food system," 95
falls within this definition. 96
Since the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act,97 adding the
current section 8(b)(4)(B) to the NLRA, there has been a sharp
9 0 See note 4 supra.
91 See note 3 supra.
92 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced per curiam, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972). See notes 42-44 supra & accompanying
text.
93 185 N.L.R.B. at 304. Some judges and commentators have since questioned
the wisdom of the Hearst rationale. See notes 118-21 infra & accompanying text.
94 Craypo, Collective Bargaining in the Conglomerate, Multinational Firm:
Litton's Shutdown of Royal Typewriter, 29 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 5 (1975).
95 PET, INc. Ar. REP. inside back cover (1977).
96The Board specifically referred to Pet as a conglomerate. United Steel-
workers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (Aug. 10, 1979), [1979-80] NLRB Dec.
f16,127, at 30,188, 30,189, appeal docketed, No. 79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 1979).
9TLabor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landnm-Griffin) Act of 1959
§ 704(a) Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 542 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1976).
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increase in the number and size of conglomerates." At the same
time, union membership as a percentage of the labor force has
98 It was not until the late 1960's that the shift away from horizontal and
vertical corporate mergers toward conglomerate mergers became significant.
L. SuLi.wN, ANirnuUsT 653 (1977). See FORTUNE MAGAZINE EDITORS, THE
CONGLOMERATE CO!MMOTION 8 (1970); Alexander, Conglomerate Mergers and
Collective Bargaining, 24 IDrus. & LAB. REL. BEv. 354, 355 (1971).
The following data illustrate this trend:
U.S. MaERcns Azzo AcQisrroNs
($10 M=IoN & OVER)































Mergers and Industrial Concentration: Hearings on Acquisitions and Mergers by
Conglomerates of Unrelated Businesses before the Subcom. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1978)
(data supplied by Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics) [hereinafter
cited as Conglomerate Hearings].
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slowly, but almost steadily, declined.99 These trends, combined
with the unique structural characteristics of conglomerates have
resulted in a weakening of the "traditional balance-of-power prem-
ise . . . [that has] institutionalized collective bargaining." 100 The
99 The decline in union membership as a proportion of the labor force is
demonstrated by the following table:








Year excluding Percent Percent
Canada Number members Number members
1958 17,029 70,275 24.2 51,363 33.2
1959 17,117 70,921 '24.1 53,313 32.1
1960 17,049 72,142 23.6 54,234 31.4
1961 16,303 73,031 22.3 54,042 30.2
1962 16,586 73,442 22.6 55,596 29.8
1963 16,524 74,571 22.2 56,702 29.1
1964 16,841 75,830 22.2 58,331 28.9
1965 17,299 77,178 22.4 60,815 28.4
1966 17,940 78,893 22.7 63,955 28.1
1967 18,367 80,793 22.7 65,857 27.9
1968 18,916 82,272 23.0 67,951 27.8
1969 19,036 84,240 22.6 70,442 27.0
1970 19,381 85,903 22.6 70,920 27.3
1971 19,211 86,929 22.1 71,222 27.0
1972 19,435 88,991 21.8 73,714 26.4
1973 19,851 91,040 21.8 76,896 25.8
1974 20,199 93,240 21.7 78,413 25.8
1975 19,553 94,793 20.6 77,364 25.3
1976 19,634 96,917 20.3 80,048 24.5
1977 19,902 99,534 20.0 82,423 24.1
1978 20,246 102,534 19.7 84,446 24.0
Totals include reported membership and directly affiliated local union
members. Total reported Canadian membership and members of single-
firm unions are excluded.
U.S. BuREAu OF LA.Boa STAT~sTcs, DEP'T OF LABoa, Bu-.iL. No. 1937, DREcTORY
OF NATIONAL UNIoNs AND EMPLOYEE ASsOCI&TIONS, 1975 (1977); Telephone
conversation with Eugene Becker, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Sept. 4, 1980)
(citing statistics from DnucToRY OF NATIONAL UNIONs AND EMPLOYEE Assocj&-
TIONS, 1979). Membership totals of single-firm unions are excluded.
100 Craypo, supra note 94, at 21. See Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69
(Hearst Publications), 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 307 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) (Board Member Brown dis-
senting on ground that the decision distorted the balance of power by shielding an
employer from his own dispute); Mueller, Conglomerates: A "Nonindustry," in
TBE SraUc-uPE OF AmErIcAN INDUSTRY 442, 450 (W. Adams ed., 5th ed. 1977);
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many unions involved with a single conglomerate may frequently
constitute a "diverse set of weak opponents" 101 when arrayed
against management. 02 These imbalances, and the Board's unique
analysis of the conglomerate structure involved in Pet,10 3 suggest
that the labor policies governing union activity against con-
glomerates should be reexamined, and the ally doctrine revised.
A conglomerate's power in labor negotiations stems from its
size and diversification, which give it the ability to "cross-sub-
sidize between industries and plants and whipsaw different unions
at... various facilities-supported by substantially enhanced finan-
cial staying power." 10' A multiplant firm, with each plant ac-
counting for only a portion of the firm's total business, is obviously
better able to withstand economic pressure from a union if this
pressure is limited to one or a few of its plants: 105 it can weather
an "economic assault on any one of its operations" ' 06 while con-
centrating on long-run concerns. 07
Conglomerate Hearings, supra note 98, at 146 (statement of M. Pertschuk, FTC
Chairman). Cf. Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 1373, 1378
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977) (per curiam) (statement of
Bazelon, J.) (noting that a division that can count on corporation support during
a labor dispute "will obviously have greater bargaining strength than a division
which truly stands alone"); Asher, Secondary Boycotts-Allied, Neutral and Single
Employers, 52 GEo. L.J 406, 417 (1964) (a union unable to apply pressure di-
rectly to the whole of an enterprise is deprived of an economic weapon); Kujawa,
U.S. Labor, Multinational Enterprise, and the National Interest: A Proposal for
Labor Law Reform, 10 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 941, 942 (1978) (the power balance
has tipped in favor of business).
11o Hildebrand, Coordinated Bargaining: An Economist's Point of View, in
[1968] PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL SPING MEETNG oF THE INDUS. REL. RESEAR CH
Ass'N, 524, 526.
' 0
2 The union is at an additional disadvantage if the corporation, in addition to
being a conglomerate, is also multinational. A multinational corporation has been
defined as "any corporation in which ownership, management, production, and
sales activity extend over more than one jurisdiction." GrmrN, SENATE Conuv-rrrr
oN LABOR AND PUBLic WEIPARE, THE MULTINATIONAL COB.UORATI6N AND =
NATIONAL INTERsT, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973). Such a corporation presented
with a labor dispute can subsidize American subsidiaries with foreign profits or can
even decide to move its operations completely outside of the country. See Craypo,
supra note 94, at 19. See generally Ross, American Legal Restrictions on the Use
of Union Economic Weapons Against Multinational Employers, 10 CORNEL IN'L
LJ. 59 (1976); Gunter, Erosion of Trade Union Power Through Multinational
Enterprises?, 9 VAND. I. TRANSNAT'L L. 771, 772 (1976); Comment, National Labor
Unions v. Multinational Companies: The Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power,
11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 124 (1972).
103 pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 18, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,193. See text
accompanying note 77 supra.
104 Alexander, supra note 98, at 362. See Mueller, supra note 100, at 450-51.
Cf. Hearst Publications, 185 N.L.R.B. at 320 (decision of the trial examiner) (sub-
sidiary or division profits are "fuel for the total corporate body . .. available at its
will to sustain any division in a . . . labor dispute").
105 Brinker, The Ally Doctrine, 23 LAB. L.J. 543, 558-59 (1972).
1o Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 19, [1979-80) NLRB Dec. at 30,193.
107 Edwards, The Large Conglomerate Firm: A Critical Appraisal, in MONOPOLY
IpowEf AND ECONOMIC PEnFOnMANCE 117-18 (E. Mansfield ed. 1968). See gen-
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A major goal of labor relations policy is to strike an appropri-
ate power balance, normally as close to equality as possible, be-
tween management and labor. This is desirable because the col-
lective bargaining process is jeopardized if either party possesses
excessive bargaining power.108 For the purposes of this Comment,
the effect that the recent proliferation of conglomerates has had
upon the power balance between management and labor may be
assessed by examining the practical constraints placed upon the
economic weapons available to a union involved in a labor dis-
pute with a subsidiary or a division of a conglomerate.
A union involved in a labor dispute with a subsidiary, because
of section 8(b)(4), will not be able to bring to bear any of its more
traditional weapons-boycotts, picketing, or handbilling-on a parent
corporation or its noninvolved subsidiaries, unless the handbilling
falls within the proviso or unless the nonpublicity activities in a
given case are considered to be outside the scope of the section.
Thus, unless a union can legitimize its purportedly secondary ac-
tivity against the parent or other subsidiaries, it will not be able to
place pressure on those very units that may be subsidizing the em-
ployer with whom the union has its dispute. Such activities will be
permitted only under three doctrines. A union may "follow the
struck product" 109 or picket a common situs,110 but these exclusions
will not be discussed here because when they apply to a given con-
glomerate situation it is for reasons basically unrelated to the cor-
porate structure involved. The ally doctrine,"' however, is directed
toward those situations where employers combine their economic
forces against a union, and such a combination is more likely to be
reasonably alleged by a union when the two employers are related
by common ownership. In such a case, the incentive to become
allied is greater because of the potential benefit to the long-run
profitability of the entire conglomerate in more effectively resisting
a union's demands, and the potential for effective aid to the struck
erally Dougherty, The Case Against Bigness: Politics, Power and Technological
Inertia, 11 ANTIrrusT L. & EcoN. REv., Issue No. 2 at 41 (1979).
108 See Lodge 76, Int'l Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 146, 146 n.7 (1976); Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 392 (1968); Nat'l Wood-
work Mfrs. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967); Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 (1964); NLRB v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
362 U.S. 274, 289 (1960); Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v.
NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958); G. FARnm, COLrcTvE BARGAn G xN
TRANsrIToN 56 (1967); St. Antione, Secondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo: A Study
in Balance of Power, 40 U. DET. L.J. 189, 190 (1962).
109 See note 24 supra & accompanying text.
110 See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
111 See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
[Vol. 12.9:221
SECONDARY ACTIVITY UNDER NLA
employer is greater because of the possibility for cross-subsidiza-
tion. u2  But the doctrine rarely will aid a union bargaining with
only one unit of a conglomerate because neither branch of the
doctrine generally will facilitate a union's efforts to boycott the
other units. The struck-work branch deals -exclusively with an
outside firm performing the work of a struck firm. It does not cover
the other services and financial support that a parent corporation
may be supplying to a struck subsidiary."13 Because a conglomerate
has many product lines, only a small portion of the conglomerate is
likely to be capable of performing struck work. A parent corpora-
tion's aid to its subsidiaries, therefore, is not likely to be in the
form of struck work and the union is not likely to reach a substan-
tial portion of a conglomerate under the struck-work branch of the
ally doctrine.
It is also difficult for a union to boycott a conglomerate under
the single-employer branch of the ally doctrine because, under that
branch, the union must prove actual control of the subsidiary by
the parent before the Board and the courts will-for the purpose of
the NLRA-pierce the corporate veil and treat two commonly owned
corporations as one." 4  It is more difficult for a union to establish
that a primary and secondary employer are really a single employer
than to demonstate that a secondary employer is not neutral be-
cause it performs the work of a struck employer." 5 The law re-
quires "more than the existence of 100 per cent common stock
control and even more than outright ownership by the same legal
entity before two physically separated facilities will be considered a
single employer." "16 This requirement has been upheld even when
a parent and its subsidiaries have an "inescapable community of in-
terest" 17 in each other's labor policies.
The inflexible application of the actual control test to deter-
mine when one part of a conglomerate is allied with another can
lead to inequitable results because it may exclude consideration
of factors that distort the balance of bargaining power between
union and management. Judge Bazelon, filing a separate opinion in
112 See text accompanying notes 104-107 supra.
113 Brinker, supra note 105, at 558-59.
14 Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local No. 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405, 408-09
(D.C. Cir. 1963); J. G. Roy & Sons v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771, 773-74 (1st Cir.
1958); Shore v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 316 F. Supp. 426, 430
(W.D. Pa. 1970). See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
115 Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing-Following the Struck Product, 52
VA. L. REv. 189, 205-06 n.63 (1966).
"16Asher, supra note 100, at 417.
17 Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp,
19 U. KAw. L. REv. 651, 667 (1971).
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Local 391, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB,
1 18
argued that the test is not a "common sense" evaluation of neutral-
ity.119 A better test would include an assessment of the tactical bar-
gaining advantage an employer gains from a corporate relationship,
and "some consideration of the extent to which the corporation is-
or appears to be-able and willing to support its divisions (financially
and otherwise), if they should become involved in protracted labor
disputes." 120 Judge Bazelon thus favors a "wide-ranging, flexible
inquiry" by the Board or a court deciding whether two business
entities should be treated as a single employer for purposes of dis-
tinguishing protected primary from unlawful secondary activity.121
The actual control test also suffers from problems of proof.
For example, the employer possesses the critical information that
the union may need to prove actual control. Although this in-
formation can be elicited through the federal discovery process
when the General Counsel of the Board initiates an injunction pro-
ceeding in district court under section 10(1) of the NLRA, 122 the
time pressures inherent in such a proceeding may preclude the fully
effective use of discovery procedures.12 3  Apart from such discovery,
the union can obtain information by cross-examining company of-
ficials in the injunction and unfair labor practice proceedings, 2 4 but
118,543 F.2d 1373, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977)
(separate opinion of Bazelon, I.). The Local 391 decision is a per curiam opinion
in which the D.C. Circuit denied a rehearing on a Board decision directing the
union to cease and desist from a secondary boycott. Judge Bazelon addressed the
ally doctrine issue in a separate opinion filed to explain why he voted to deny
rehearing en banc.
119 Id.
120 Id. 1378. A subsidiary or division that can count on the corporate parent's
support will "obviously have greater bargaining strength than a division which
truly stands alone." Id.
121 Id. 1377. Although Judge Bazelon did not specifically endorse a particular
approach, he did quote, for purposes of comparison with the actual control test,
the test used by the Eighth Circuit in Royal Typewriter. Id. 1379 n.3. See text
accompanying note 138 infra.
12229 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976).
123 The section stresses the importance of quick action in these cases: "When-
ever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of paragraph 4(A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b). ... the preliminary
investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all
other cases. . . ." Id. Section 10(i) states that "[p]etitions filed under this Act
shall be heard expeditiously, and if possible within ten days after they have been
docketed." 29 U.S.C. § 160(i) (1976). Although a union may indeed be able
to gather useful information even with the pressure to move expeditiously with the
injunction proceeding-the union in Pet was successful in doing so-it is at the
least important to note the possibility of the problem arising in any given actual
control doctrine case.
124 Unfair labor practice proceedings are conducted, "so far as practicable," in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence. NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1976).
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this is an unsure method of obtaining the complicated financial and
operating information needed to prove actual control. The union
would be wise not to rely on the Regional Director's investigation-
in Pet, it consisted of two affidavits and a telephone call =2-because
it is initially undertaken under pressured time circumstances, and
once a decision is made to file a complaint, the Regional Director has
little incentive to pursue evidence establishing the other employer's
control of the primary employer.
12
Another deficiency of the test is that it invites circumvention
through cosmetic changes in management procedures and operations.
In Western Union Corp. (United Telegraph Workers),127 a section
8(a)(5) case that hinged on whether the parent should have bar-
gained not only for itself but also for some of its subsidiaries, the
majority of the Board rejected the union's actual control argu-
ment,28 relying on the fact that the parent's and subsidiary's officers,
especially their directors of labor relations, were not the same
persons. Member Fanning, however, maintained that the officers
might nevertheless be acting under the control of the parent. 2 9 An
implication of this decision is that if a conglomerate with control
over its subsidiaries arranges its operations so as to give the appear-
ance of independence by minimizing the most visible signs of con-
trol, the Board deciding the case may not undertake an inquiry suf-
125 Brief for Respondent Before the NLRB at 7 n.4, Pet.
126 See note 123 supra.
The NLRA does not contain any other provisions which would help a union
obtain the information needed to prove actual control. The § 7(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157(d) (1976), obligation of an employer to bargain in good faith requires an
employer to furnish the union which represents its employees with certain informa-
tion needed by the bargaining representatives of the union for the proper perform-
ance of their duties. NLBB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967)
(citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956)). The information an
employer is required to furnish, however, is not the data a union needs to prove
that a parent actually controls a subsidiary. For example, the employer must
furnish wage and other data which aids the union in performing its bargaining
obligation, but the employer is not required under section 7(d) to furnish the
union with documents concerning the financing and management of subsidiaries.
Only this type of financial and management data could establish actual control.
See generally, B. GomaLxm AND C. Wnumun, STATUTORY OBLIGATION OF Ax
E~mLOym TO FURNiSH INFOrMATON TO A UNION (1971).
127224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976).
128 Id. 275, 279. Cf. Hearst Publications, 185 N.L.R.B. at 304, 320 (con-
cluding that there was no actual control despite the trial examiner's finding that
local management was the instrument of the parent corporation). But see Local
391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLBB, 543 F.2d 1373, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977) (stating in dictum that a "specious intra-
corporate arrangement, contrived to take advantage of the protection of the
secondary boycott provisions of the Act, obviously would stand on a different
footing").
129 224 N.L.R.B. at 277-79 (member Fanning dissenting).
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ficient to uncover the corporate reality, and consequently may treat
the parent and its various subsidiaries as separate employers. 30
IV. RESTORING A BALANCE BETWEEN UNIONS AND
CONGLOMERATES
A. The "Present and Apparent Means" Test
If, as this Comment has argued, unions are often at an unfair
disadvantage when bargaining with units of conglomerates ' 31 and
the Board's test for a producer enunciated in Pet could be ex-
tended to result in too much union activity directed against
commonly-owned employers; 132 a new test encompassing both of
these concerns is needed to determine the neutrality of secondary
employers. The problem of excess conglomerate bargaining power
is a general one that should be dealt with in the section 8(b)(4)
context of the ally doctrine; the publicity proviso should be used
to resolve those problems when there really is a producer-distribu-
tor nexus apart from the intracorporate financial structure. 33
One commentator has suggested that the neutrality of com-
monly owned corporations be evaluated by determining whether
the union activity at issue strikes the same "economic purse" at
the primary and "secondary" sites.' 34 If so, the secondary employer
would not be considered neutral. Common ownership alone,
under this test, would be a sufficient basis for treating two cor-
porations as a single employer. This test is too broad, however.
It sets up a per se rule that, when applied to commonly owned
corporations that should be considered separate employers, would
defeat the congressional intent to limit the expansion of labor dis-
putes.135 It thus suffers from the same defect as the Pet test.136
130 This problem of potential subterfuge is explored in Comment, The Single
Employer Doctrine as Applied to Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 28 CATE. U. L. REv. 555, 581-83 (1979).
131 See text accompanying notes 108-29 supra.
132 See text accompanying notes 84-93 supra.
133 See notes 68-79 supra & accompanying text.
134 Asher, supra note 100, at 418. The economic purse test illustrates that a
parent and a subsidiary are not "neutral" in the sense that the outcome of a labor
dispute affects the profitability of both. See also Brinker, supra note 100, at 558
(suggesting that commonly owned firms operating independently should be con-
sidered allies rather than neutrals); Comment, supra note 130, at 584-85 (sug-
gesting a common financial control test); Comment, Consumer Picketing of
Economically Interdependent Parties: Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB
(Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN. L. REV. 631, 642-45 (1980) (suggesting
that economically interdependent parties should be considered allies).
135 See note 33 supra & accompanying text. Cf. Lesnick, The Gravamen of
the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1363, 1415 (1962) (the legislative
desire to discourage the "metastasis of labor disputes" was a major basis for re-
stricting secondary activity).
136 See notes 68-89 supra & accompanying text.
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The type of flexible inquiry that is needed to accommodate
both sides' legitimate interests was employed in the context of
sections 8(a)(1) & (5) in Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB.137 There,
the Eighth Circuit held that Litton Industries, the parent, and
Royal, its subsidiary, were allied under the single employer theory,
even though Litton did not participate in Royal's day-to-day labor
relations. The court stated that the proper test is whether the
parent corporation has
the present and apparent means to exercise its clout in
matters of labor negotiations by its divisions or subsi-
diaries and whether its course of conduct encouraged or
permitted the local negotiators to so represent the situa-
tion to union negotiators for the purpose of achieving a
tactical or strategic objective.8 8
It is submitted that the best standard for determining whether
the various units of a conglomerate should be treated as a single
employer for the purposes of section 8(b)(4)(B) is a variation of
Royal Typewriter's "present and apparent means" test. The Royal
test has not yet been applied to a section 8(b)(4)(B) situation.139
If it were applied in this context, however, it would begin to re-
dress the present imbalance of economic power favoring conglom-
erates.' 40 It would more fairly determine when an unfair labor
practice has been committed against a neutral employer because
it recognizes that a parent corporation may achieve a bargaining
advantage by having the present and apparent means to ac-
complish its objectives without needing to exercise actual control.
It would not go far enough, however, because it requires both a
tactical advantage and the present and apparent means of control,
and therefore is subject to the problem of subterfuge.' 4 ' Under
the Royal test, a conglomerate could avoid a single-employer de-
termination so long as the parent company did not permit "the
137533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976). Judge Bazelon called for a similar
inquiry in Local 391, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 543 F.2d
1373, 1377-79 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977). See notes
118-21 supra & accompanying text.
138Id. 1043. Litton met this test because it "reserved to itself a role in
major expenditures, budget control, acquisitions and plans, including any decision
to close a plant"; provided labor relations advice to subsidiaries; and sent its
director of labor relations to sit in on negotiations with the union. Id. 1041-42.
139 Royal was charged with violating §§ 8(a)(1) & (5) of the NLRA, pertain-
ing to unlawful restraint of union activities and failure to bargain in good faith.
Id. 1034.
140 See notes 97-107 supra & accompanying text
14' See notes 127-29 supra & accompanying text.
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local negotiators to so represent the situation [of parent company
control] to union negotiators for the purpose of achieving a tactical
or strategic objective." 142 Absent such representations, the union
negotiators might still be aware of and affected by the imbalancedc
bargaining situation, yet the Board or a court applying the test
could not make a single-employer finding.
This Comment proposes that the Royal Typewriter "present
and apparent means" test be modified for use by the Board and
courts in the section 8(b)(4) context by eliminating the test's
tactical or strategic advantage requirement. .43 A procedure should
be adopted that, first, requires a preliminary showing from the
union that the parent corporation has complete, or close to com-
plete, ownership of the primary employer.'4 Once such own-
ership is demonstrated, it would be presumed that the parent
corporation possesses the present and apparent means to materially
influence the outcome of a labor dispute.1 45  The burden having
142 Royal Typewriter, 533 F.2d at 1043.
-14 3 For convenience, this Comment refers to the application of the proposed
test as by the Board and the Courts, but, as noted above, before a case ever
reaches the Board it is heard by a NLBB regional attorney and an administrative
law judge. See note 27 supra. In any given case, the proposed procedure would
be utilized first by the regional attorney who must decide whether to file an unfair
labor practice complaint against the union. If a complaint is issued, an adminis-
trative law judge would then be required to use the proposed standard to make a
judgment whether the complaining employer is in fact neutral, see note 27 supra;
if no complaint is issued by the regional attorney (or by the General Counsel, his
superior, on appeal), the decision is nonreviewable (by the administrative law
judge) and the matter ends there. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
A hearing before an administrative law judge is similar to a normal hearing
in federal district court. Although the NLRB is technically the complainant, the
employer claiming neutrality also has the opportunity to present evidence sub-
stantiating its claim. R. GoRmAN, supra note 23, at 8. To the extent practicable,
the hearing operates under the Federal Rules of Evidence. NLRA § 10(b), 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
144 Complete or close to complete ownership should mean, at the least, more
than fifty-percent ownership. The exact figure chosen will necessarily be somewhat
arbitrary, but this should not preclude making such a finding. Determinations of
this nature frequently are made in other contexts. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1501-1504,
1563(a)(1) (80% stock ownership or voting power required for affiliated group
of corporations to file consolidated tax returns or receive a single surtax exemption);
ALI-ABA MoDEL Bus. CoRp. AcT §75 (1979 (90% ownership of shares of each
class of another corporation needed for a "short merger"); DEL. ConE A~Nr. tit. 8,
§ 253 (1975) (90% ownership of shares needed for "short merger").
14 5 To execute the proposal's shifting of the burden of proof of neutrality upon
a finding of common ownership, various procedures could be used. For example,
the burden could shift when the union avers common ownership in its answer to,
the complaint, if its averment were accompanied by some manner of documentary
proof. Cases that are appealed from the administrative law judge to the Board
itself are usually disposed of on the basis of written briefs and records; few
restrictions exist on the Board's scope of decision. See generally R. GoRMAN, supra
note 23, at 7-9. Under the proposed standard, it would be incumbent upon the
commonly-owned employer to argue from the record established below that it does
[Vol. 129:221
SECONDARY ACTIVITY UNDER NLRA
shifted to the parent corporation, it would use the information it
possesses relevant to the single employer determination to try to
rebut the presumption that it has the present and apparent means
to materially influence the outcome of a labor dispute. If the
parent cannot rebut the presumption, all of the units of the
conglomerate should constitute the primary employer and union
activity should be permitted against all of its operations.146
The indicators currently used by the Board to determine
whether actual control exists-interrelation of operations, common
management, and centralized control of labor relations-should
be relevant to the rebuttal. These should be defined broadly and
used to assess the parent's present and apparent means of control,
rather than to demonstrate the presence or absence of actual con-
trol. Moreover, to prevent the test from becoming too rigid, the
Board and the courts should not hesitate to consider additional
factors when warranted.147 It should remain an "all the circum-
stances" test, with no one rebuttal factor controlling.
The proposed test retains the positive features of current
law. It is not meant to apply to non-conglomerates, and therefore
would not preclude a union from demonstrating under the tradi-
tional ally doctrine that two corporations that do not have a high
degree of common ownership are nonetheless allies. It also would
allow the employer to rebut the presumption of common control
even when two unincorporated divisions-rather than separately
incorporated divisions-of a single corporation are involved, al-
not have the present and apparent means to influence the outcome of the labor
dispute.
There is no reason why a corporation, considered a separate entity for corpo-
rate law purposes, must also be considered a separate entity for secondary boycott
purposes. Policy considerations in these two areas are very different. The labor
law policies of protecting neutral employers from disputes not their own while pro-
tecting the union's right to exert legitimate economic pressure can be fostered by
changing the ally doctrine without infringing upon the corporate law policies of
limiting liability and fostering capital formation. See generally R. HAmrLTov,
Coaonu roNs 8 (1976).
146This test presumes that at a minimum the parent corporation possesses
potential control which can be readily converted into active control. The extension
of the primary dispute to all of the subsidiaries and divisions of a conglomerate,
rather than just the parent, is necessary because, if the parent functions only as a
holding company, a standard enabling the union to extend the dispute only to the
parent and not to the other units would not provide the union with any additional
economic leverage. Moreover, even if the parent itself conducts business opera-
tions, it derives additional strength, which could be used during a labor dispute,
from its other subsidiaries.
147For example, whether a struck subsidiary has been operating at a loss or
was recently acquired by the parent corporation may be relevant to a neutrality
determination. The Board may be able to infer from these factors that a parent
corporation would be likely to retain the present and apparent means to interfere
in the labor relations of an unprofitable or recently acquired company.
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though the employer might have a very difficult case in such situa-
tions, because unincorporated divisions of a corporation "may be
created or abolished [by the parent corporation] without even the
stroke of a pen." 145
The proposed test has several advantages over the actual con-
trol test. First, it is specifically designed to resolve the problem
of imbalanced bargaining power. 149 By allowing unions to place
pressure on all those employers that have the capability and are
likely to indirectly interfere in negotiations with primary em-
ployers, it is hoped that the balance would move toward the
equilibrium envisioned by Congress in passing the National Labor
Relations Act. 50
Second, the proposed test would reduce the likelihood of sub-
terfuge. 15' It is of course unlikely that this problem can be com-
pletely eliminated, but the present and apparent means test is
advantageous in that it does not give undue weight to factors that
are particularly vulnerable to the problem. For example, the test
does not require the overt participation of the parent corporation in
the subsidiary's labor negotiations. Instead, it recognizes that in-
volvement of this nature may be present but not detectable by out-
siders. Shifting the burden of proof from the union to management
properly places it upon the party with the best access to relevant
information, which would make it more difficult for management to
cover up evidence that is probative of the type of relationship
between the parent and subsidiary.
Third, adoption of the proposed test would help to remedy
the unions' bargaining problems with conglomerates while remain-
ing consistent with the legislative intent behind section 8(b)(4)(B) of
the NLRA.9 2 Congress wished to protect neutrals from the labor
148 British Indus. Co. (Local 475, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers),
218 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1134 (1975). Protection from union economic weapons should
not depend on "the fortuitous structuring of a business organization." Goetz, supra
note 117, at 667.
149 See notes 97-107 supra & accompanying text.
150 See note 108 supra & accompanying text.
'5' See notes 127-30 supra & accompanying text.
1
52 In enacting the Landrum-Griffin Act, Congress rejected a proposal that
would have excluded from the definition of the 8(b)(4) terms "person" and "other
person," "businesses doing business with one another when one is owned or con-
trolled by the other or is owned or controlled substantially in common." 105
CONG. FEc. 17,881 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HsT., supra note 33, at 1425. The
legislative history does not explain why this amendment was rejected. Although
an argument could be made that Congress demonstrated its approval of the then-
existing state of the law by rejecting the amendment, this argument would not seem
to apply to the conglomerate question. At the time of passage, Congress may
have failed to perceive the importance of deciding when subsidiaries should be
treated as separate employers for secondary boycott purposes, or may have thought
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disputes of other employers, and the test would work toward that
end by keeping a given dispute within the clearly defined limits of
the conglomerate, and by allowing the complaining employer to
show that it or its parent does not have the means to control the pri-
mary employer's labor relations.
Finally, the proposed test would resolve the problem of pub-
licity proviso interpretation that arose in Pet. If all of the units of
a conglomerate are considered to constitute a single "person," union
handbilling activities directed against all of them are legal. The
Board, in order to establish the legitimacy of such activity, would
not need to resort to a strained interpretation of the proviso that
places no effective limitation on the definition of "producer." 163
B. Applying the Proposed Test
The following situations illustrate how the present and appar-
ent means test, if adopted, would operate differently than the actual
control test. If the union in Pet had struck, rather than handbilled,
various units of the entire conglomerate, an examination of the
actual control branch of the ally doctrine would have been neces-
sary. Under the actual control test, the Board would have found
common ownership, but in all probability no parent corporation
control over Hussmann's daily operations or labor relations.'5 Pet
it better to leave this issue to future resolution by the Board and the courts. Com-
ment, supra note 130, at 562-63. Moreover, even if Congress had intended to
resolve the single employer issue for large corporations in general, it might have
decided the issue differently had it specifically considered the conglomerate prob-
lem. The trend toward conglomerate expansion was only beginning at the time
the 1959 amendments were debated, so Congress probably would not have fore-
seen that the distinctions between the structure of conglomerates and other large
corporations had ramifications in the labor area-the most important being that
a union's use of its traditional economic weapons is more likely to be lawful under
the NLRA when it is dealing with a vertically or horizontally integrated corpora-
tion than when it is dealing with a diversified conglomerate. See text accompany-
ing notes 111-17.
153 See notes 84 & 85 supra & accompanying text.
Another way that the Pet Board could have avoided using such an overly broad
test while permitting the union to publicize its position would have been for it to
base its decision on the freedom of speech issue raised by the union. See Brief
for Respondent at 58-66, United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6
(Aug. 10, 1979), [1979-80] NLRB Dec. ff 16,127, at 30,188, appeal docketed, No.
79-1852 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 1979). The Board, however, found it unnecessary to
address the issue because it decided the case in the union's favor based on its
interpretation of the proviso. Although reasonable conflicting statutory interpreta-
tions should be resolved in favor of the one that does not require a constitutional
adjudication, United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948), unreasonable statu-
tory interpretations should not be relied upon to avoid these questions. The Board
should either adopt a test that is based upon a more reasonable interpretation of
the NLRA than is its Pet test, see notes 68-77 supra & accompanying text, or it
should confront the constitutional issue raised by the union.
154 See Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 6-7, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,189.
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thus would not have been considered allied with Hussmann. In
contrast, under the present and apparent means test, the Board
would first raise a presumption of control by the parent corporation
because Hussmann is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Pet. Pet would
then try to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the means
of control do not exist. It would present evidence showing, for ex-
ample, that each of its divisions has a separate financial system and
operates "essentially" as an independent business entity, and that
division presidents have complete control over day-to-day operations
and labor relations in their divisions.155
The union would in turn seek to demonstrate that Pet did have
the means to materially influence the outcome of the labor dispute.
It could show that Pet had in the past made an unsecured, interest-
free loan to Hussmann with no stated repayment schedule and had
provided Hussmann with legal services, including representation in
labor arbitrations; further, the union could point out that Pet cur-
rently maintains national purchasing accounts, centrally adminis-
ters a division executive and salaried employee benefit program, sets
division policies on matters ranging from taxes and accounting to
employment practices, and is responsible for long-range planning,
major capital expenditures, and other management functions. Fi-
nally, the union could point to Hussmann's negative cash flow posi-
tion with its parent since the end of fiscal year 1973.150
Although the Pet situation presents a close case, the application
of the proposed test should lead to the finding that Pet has the
present and apparent means to control Hussmann, so that the Pet
conglomerate should be treated as a single employer. Pet's ability to
control is indicated, first, by the policies Pet established for Huss-
mann. But more importantly, control is indicated by the amount of
indebtedness-formal and otherwise-Hussmann has incurred in re-
lation to Pet. Assuming Pet acts rationally in the economic sense,
it is difficult to believe that it has not replaced its lack of traditional
business controls over its borrower with more subtle controls, ready
to become more overt if Hussmann's financial situation one day calls
for such action.
Applying the proposed test to the Hearst Publications fact pat-
tern,157 all of the units of the Hearst corporation would probably be
155 Id.
156 Id. at 7-10, [1979-80] NLRB Dec. at 30,189-90.
157Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Publications), 185 N.L.R.B.
303, enforced per curiam, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1018 (1972). See text accompanying note 44 supra for description of fact pattern
and holding.
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considered a single employer. The division heads were delegated
responsibility for the day-to-day operation of its divisions, but the
parent retained a ten thousand dollar limit on division spending
absent parent approval, provided a centralized pension and insur-
ance program, and did not separately incorporate the divisions. 58
The ten thousand dollar limitation alone clearly suggests that Hearst
retained the means to control its divisions. Consequently, the
Hearst corporation, absent a very convincing countervailing consid-
eration, would not be able to rebut the presumption that its divisions
should be treated as parts of a single employer. If that is indeed
the case, the use of the present and apparent means test here would
result in a different outcome than that actually arrived at by the
Board using the actual control test.159
Royal Typewriter presents an easier case than either Pet or
Hearst. 60 Although not involved in Royal's labor relations on a
day-today basis, the parent was heavily involved in the formation
of significant policies of concern to the union; moreover, this in-
volvement was apparent to the union. Thus, just as the Board and
appellate court found for the union in the employer unfair labor
practice context, the Board would find for the union in the sec-
ondary boycott context if it uses the proposed test; under the
actual control test, the union would probably not be able to carry
its burden.
The proposed test would operate more broadly than the overly
narrow actual control test, and more narrowly than the overly broad
economic enhancement test. For example, if a corporate lender has
advanced funds to another corporation involved in a labor dispute,
the contribution of capital and the expectation of profit might be
sufficient under the economic enhancement test to allow a union to
boycott the lending corporation. If the Board applies the present
and apparent means test, however, no presumption of control would
be raised because there is little or no common ownership. The two
corporations would therefore be treated as separate employers under
the traditional ally doctrine. Likewise, when each of two commonly-
owned businesses contributes profits to the owner, but each is truly
independent from the other, use of the economic enhancement test
might favor the union because of the expected profits to the common
158 Hearst Publications, 185 N.L.R.B. at 304.
159 Id.; see text accompanying note 44 supra.
160 Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); see text
accompanying note 138 supra.
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owner. If these two businesses are clearly operated independently
of each other, however, under the present and apparent means test
they would not be considered a single employer because the pre-
sumption of control arising from common ownership could be re-
butted. The proposed test thus would prevent the spread of indus-
trial disputes to situations in which the corporate structure does not
result in a bargaining power imbalance.
V. CONCLUSION
The Board in Pet extended the definition of "producer" for
purposes of the section 8(b)(4) publicity proviso by changing from
a line-of-production test to an economic enhancement test. Al-
though the Board was legitimately desirous of protecting the steel-
workers' right to urge a consumer boycott of a parent corporation
having the ability to control its subsidiary, the reasoning it used
to protect the union's right may in the future be extended un-
justifiably far in organized labor's favor. A union may be allowed
to use publicity to harm an employer who is really neutral with
respect to the primary labor dispute. Further, if the Pet test is
extended beyond the publicity proviso context-as it might well be
if its reasoning is in the future applied without arbitrary limits-
neutral employers would be put at an even greater disadvantage.
This Comment has argued that the solution is not to continue to
use the economic enhancement standard for proviso cases while
maintaining the rigid actual control test for all other section
8(b)(4)(B) cases involving conglomerates. Rather, the Board
should seek to accommodate employers' and unions' interests by
using a "present and apparent means of control" test to make an
initial finding whether the union is engaging in any secondary
activity. A presumption of control would be raised by a showing
of common ownership, and if the parent cannot rebut this pre-
sumption, the Board would make a single-employer finding. This
standard is directed more toward the strategic and tactical realities
of union-employer bargaining than are the current approaches to
section 8(b)(4)(B) and its publicity proviso, and it is hoped that, if
adopted, it would not only help to further Congress' goal of rela-
tively balanced bargaining power, but would also help the Board
avoid advancing such strained analyses in this important area of
labor law.
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